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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
Few labor cases were presented to the Tenth Circuit during
the 1976-1977 survey period. Those cases brought before the court
were factually routine and afforded little opportunity for the
court to set new trends or to refine existing principles. The treat-
ment herein, therefore, is summary.'
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT'2
A. Bargaining Orders3
In Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB,l the court of appeals
held that there was substantial evidence5 to support the Board's
finding that the company's actions were proscribed under sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.'
The Board had overruled the administrative law judge's recom-
mendation for a new election and had ordered the company to
bargain. In upholding the order, the court relied on its prior broad
reading of the Board's authority to evaluate the necessity for a
bargaining order to overcome the influence of unfair labor prac-
tices.' The court noted that, although the evidence as to the im-
pact of the unfair labor practices on the election might appear
sparce, s "[tihe same conduct in a small, closely knit unit, be-
' Three unpublished cases are not discussed in this overview: Lanning v. Kramer, No.
75-1947 (10th Cir., July 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (Fair Labor Standards
Act); NLRB v. Allied Meat, No. 76-1072 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publi-
cation) (bargaining order); Diamond Crystal Salt v. NLRB, No. 76-1091 (10th Cir., Mar.
31, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (bargaining order).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 191-197, 557 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
4 543 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 742 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1970).
543 F.2d at 743. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969) affirmed the authority of the Board to go beyond the statutory cease-and-desist
order when deemed necessary and to fashion the appropriate remedy, including a bargain-
ing order, to overcome the effects of unfair labor practices. For Tenth Circuit interpreta-
tions of the authority conferred in Gissel, see NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498 (10th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
' Thirteen out of twenty employees had signed authorization cards. The union lost
the election five to twelve. 543 F.2d at 741.
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cause of such smallness, might render a fair election unlikely."9
On much the same reasoning and case authority, the court,
in NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.," upheld the Board's find-
ing of unfair labor practices and enforced the bargaining order.
Because the union held a majority by only one set of authoriza-
tion cards, posing a danger of disenfranchising a majority of em-
ployees, the court modified the bargaining order to include notice
to the employees of their statutory right" to petition for a new
election."
In NLRB v. John Zink Co.,' 3 the Board petitioned the court
to have the defendant company held in civil contempt for violat-
ing the court's 1973 order enforcing an NLRB order. The matter
was referred to a master from whose decision both parties ap-
pealed. The court held that the Board must establish a violation
of a judicial enforcement order by clear and convincing evidence
and that the master's findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous,
were binding.'5 The court upheld the master's findings and
adopted the master's recommendation for a cease-and-desist
order because there was "a reasonable expectation that the wrong
would be repeated."' 6
B. Secondary Boycotts
7
Carpenters District Council of Southern Colorado v. NLRB 8
arose from an NLRB order holding that the recognition picketing
of a primary construction contractor and the fining of two union
employees of a neutral subcontractor for working behind the
picket line evidenced an impermissible secondary objective. The
administrative law judge had found that the picketing ostensibly
met the criteria enunciated in Moore Dry Dock, thereby raising
I Id. at 744 (citing NLRB v. Scoler's Inc., 466 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1972)).
10 554 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972).
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1970).
" 554 F.2d at 1003.
13 551 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See NLRB v. John Zink Co., No. 74-1254 (10th Cir., June 22, 1973) (Not for Routine
Publication).
15 551 F.2d at 801 (citing W.B. Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir.
1969)).
551 F.2d at 804.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) (1970).
" 560 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1977).
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an inference of primary activity." He had concluded, however,
that the total circumstances dispelled the inference and disclosed
an intent to enmesh the neutral subcontractor and its employees
in the primary dispute.20 The Board had affirmed those findings
and conclusions.
The court ruled that the determination of intent was essen-
tially factual and accepted the Board's findings as supported by
substantial evidence.2' The court concurred in the Board's ruling
that, in this context, the fines imposed on the union members did
not meet legitimate internal union interests. It also declined to
extend the related-work doctrine2 3 to construction industry pick-
eting.
24
C. Interference with Union Activities:5 The No-Solicitation
Rule
The issue in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing v.
NLRB 2  was the extent to which the admittedly special circum-
stances inherent in a hospital environment permit modification
" Sailors Union of the Pac. (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The
criteria are:
(a) The picketing is strictly confined to times when the situs of the dispute
is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business on the
situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer.
Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
560 F.2d at 1018-19 (citing National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612
(1967); Northeastern Washington-Northern Idaho Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 152
N.L.R.B. 975 (1965)). The administrative law judge found the following specifically indic-
ative of secondary objectives: photographing the site and fining union members for work-
ing behind the picket on days when the primary employer was absent from the site; the
hours of picketing; and the union's failure to approach the primary employer for an
agreement prior to picketing. 560 F.2d at 1019 (citations omitted).
21 560 F.2d at 1019 (citing NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977)).
2 560 F.2d at 1020 (citing Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969)).
" The doctrine derives from TUE Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), wherein
the Supreme Court held that the distinction between primary and secondary picketing
turned on the relationship between the normal operations of the primary employer and
the work performed by the secondary employees. The issue arose over picketing of a
reserved gate at a General Electric plant.
21 560 F.2d at 1020 (citing NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
- 557 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
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of established standards governing solicitation rules. 7 The hospi-
tal rule prohibited solicitation on work time in both patient and
visitor access areas and in work areas. It also prohibited distribu-
tion of union material in those same areas. Solicitation and distri-
bution were limited effectively to nonworking, employee-only
areas, such as the employee cafeteria.
The NLRB agreed that legitimate hospital purposes permit-
ted prohibition of distribution and of solicitation, even on non-
work time, in strictly patient care areas, such as patients' rooms,
x-ray rooms and therapy rooms. The Board reasoned, however,
that patients well enough to frequent hallways, lounges, and pub-
lic areas of the hospital were well enough to withstand any
"unsettling effects" of union publicity. The Board further de-
cided that solicitation could not be restricted in employee-only
working areas.
The court of appeals upheld the Board's ruling to the extent
that the rule prohibited solicitation and distribution in work
areas where there was "no commingling of patients and employ-
ees. "2 The Board's ruling as to patient access areas, however,
turned upon an evaluation of the relative condition of each pa-
tient, which the Tenth Circuit stated was well outside the recog-
nized expertise of the Board. ' The court observed inconsistencies
between the Board's rationale in this case and the recent Mount
Airy FoundationN ruling.
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the hospital's interest
in purely commercial areas, such as public cafeterias and gift
shops, was not affected by their location in a hospital, thereby
permitting a prohibition on solicitation and distribution in these
areas.3 1 NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital32 was distinguished largely
' Rules forbidding solicitation during nonworking time and distribution of union
literature in nonworking areas during nonworking time are presumptively invalid.
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
557 F.2d at 1376.
0 Id. at 1373.
217 N.L.R.B. 802 (1975). In that case the Board declined to distinguish between
"direct" and "indirect" patient care for unit-determination purposes, as all employees
were involved in patient care. The Tenth Circuit commented that this interrelation of
operations applied equally to an attempt to distinguish patient-care and nonpatient-care
areas. 557 F.2d at 1373 n.6.
11 557 F.2d at 1375 (citing Marriott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978 (1976);
McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (1973)).
3 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977).
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on "the very substantial employee use" of the cafeteria and coffee





Sheet Metal Workers Local 49 v. Los Alamos Constructors,
Inc.3 involved a determination of the appropriate forum for set-
tlement of a dispute over the company's division of work between
sheet metal workers and ironworkers. Plaintiff union filed a griev-
ance with the sheet metal industry dispute forum, the National
Joint Adjustment Board [NJAB], as provided for in its collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the defendant. The company de-
clined to participate in the hearing on jurisdictional grounds. The
trial court refused to enforce the resulting award against the com-
pany on the grounds that the Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes
Board [IJDB] of the Building and Trades Council, AFL-CIO,
with whom all three parties had an agreement to submit jurisdic-
tional disputes, was the appropriate forum. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed.
The court of appeals dismissed the union's claim of limita-
tion on the court's authority to overrule an arbitral decision36 on
the basis that the issue was not the arbitrability of the jurisdic-
tional dispute, but the proper forum for a binding determination.
In rejecting the jurisdiction of the NJAB, the court, relying heav-
ily on the rationale in Local 416 Sheet Metal Workers v. Helge-
steel Corp.,37 stated that both prior case law38 and the collective
bargaining agreement itselP required inquiry into pertinent out-
' 554 F.2d at 1375-76 n.7. The Seventh Circuit recently ruled opposite to the Tenth
Circuit on two major points. First, a hospital may prohibit organizational activities in
immediate patient care areas, but not in other patient access areas. Second, the primary
purpose of a hospital is patient care. As such, the more relaxed retail standards do not
apply to purely commercial areas. Lutheran Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 82 LAB.
CAS. (CCH) 10,165 (1977).
29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), 185(c) (1970).
550 F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1977).
The courts "have no business overruling [an arbitrator] because their interpreta-
tion of the contract is different from his" as long as the award "draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 597 (1960).
r 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974).
Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157
(1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967); Sheet Metal Workers v. Aetna Steel Prods.
Corp., 359 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839 (1966).
1 "Agreements, national in scope between Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
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side agreements. In its examination of the documentary evidence,
the court ruled that both unions, through affiliation, were bound
by the Trades Council constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the IJDB.40 All of the parties were further bound by their sepa-
rate agreements with the Council.4 As additional support for its
position, the court noted the deference accorded IJDB decisions
by the NLRB12 and the conditions under which this deference is
permissible.43
In response to the union's contention that section 10(k) of the
National Management Relations Act" demonstrates congres-
sional intent for voluntary jurisdictional-dispute settlement, the
court cited case authority indicative of the need for a binding
decision when voluntary attempts fail." The court also dismissed
the union's claim that the defendant's failure to petition the
IJDB when the dispute arose estopped it from raising the juris-
dictional claim at trial."8
II. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 7
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit in Usery v.
District 22, UMW8 ruled that the union's preliminary support
requirements"9 for qualification as a candidate for district and
subdistrict elections violated the "reasonable opportunity" stan-
dard established in the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
ciation and other international unions, covering work jurisdiction shall be respected
and applied by the employer ...... 550 F.2d at 1262.
40 Article X of the constitution provides: "All jurisdictional disputes between or
among affiliated . . . unions . . . and employers shall be settled and adjusted according
to the present plan established by the Building & Construction Trades Department ....
Said present plan .. .shall be recognized as final and binding .... Id. at 1264.
41 Id.
" Id. (citing Don Cartage Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1966)).
550 F.2d at 1264 (citing Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971)).
U 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970).
41 550 F.2d at 1263 (citing NLRB v. Radio & TV Broadcast Engineers Local 1212, 364
U.S. 573 (1961)).
" 550 F.2d at 1265.
47 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
" 543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1976).
4 Candidacy for a district office required nomination by five locals within the 16-local
district. Candidacy for a subdistrict office required nomination by three locals within the
subdistrict. Subdistrict One was composed of four locals in Wyoming. The 12 locals of
Subdistrict Two were scattered throughout Utah and Arizona. Each local was permitted
to nominate one person for each available position. It was, therefore, possible for a candi-
date representing a substantial number of employees to fail to qualify. There could be only
one candidate for subdistrict offices in Wyoming. Id. at 747-48.
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closure Act.5 The court recognized the statutory intent of insur-
ing a "free and democratic election"'" and found that the statu-
tory standard did not differ greatly from the standard enunciated
in Storer v. Brown 2 and Williams v. Rhodes" which governs in
political elections. Although the UMW constitution had been
amended immediately after the 1973 elections at issue, so that
the exact situation could not recur, the court reluctantly ordered
new elections for the positions which carried four-year terms.
Ill. NORIuS-LA GUARDIA ACT 5
Utilities Services Engineering v. Colorado Building & Con-
struction Trades Council55 involved an allegation of conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and a petition to enjoin
picketing. Utilities Services was a non-union contractor which
employed no one the union wished to represent. Utilities Services
refused to sign an agreement which was not limited to a particu-
lar site and which would have required their subcontractors to
honor area wage standards. The defendant picketed Utilities'
worksite on Johns-Manville property. The picketing caused
plaintiff Blackington & Decker's 450 union employees to walk off
the job at another Johns-Manville site located over one mile
away. At the hearing for a temporary restraining order, the trial
court made no express ruling on the legality of the agreement.,
Without admitting evidence, the court dismissed the petition for
a temporary restraining order on the grounds that provisions of
the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited such relief. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed the denial of both the temporary restraining order and a
hearing for a preliminary injunction. 7
0 "A reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and
every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office
(subject to . . .reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) .... 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)
(1970).
11 543 F.2d at 749 (citing Wirtz v. Local 153, GBBA, 389 U.S. 463 (1968); Wirtz v.
Motel & Club Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968)).
" 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
53 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932).
549 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1977).
9 The Sherman antitrust action is pending in district court. Utilities Servs. Eng'r
v. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, No. 76-M-447 (D. Colo., filed May 23, 1976).
0 Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a secondary boycott charge with the NLRB. The
administrative law judge ruled that the agreement, which exempted employees in a collec-
tive bargaining relationship and which was not limited to the jobsite, was not designed to
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After reviewing relevant case authority,8 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the controversy arose from a labor dispute within
the meaning of the statute. 5' Since admittedly no fraud or vio-
lence marred the publicity picketing and, inasmuch as the pick-
ets had been removed, obviating any immediate threat of harm,
the court found no grounds for interference under 29 U.S.C. sec-
tion 104.60
The court also dismissed plaintiff's claim that an injunction
should issue on the allegation of an unlawful agreement. Mere
allegation of a statutory violation has repeatedly been held insuf-
ficient to overcome the Norris-La Guardia proscription on injunc-
tions.6' The court distinguished Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW on its
facts. 2 Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that a union
is subject to antitrust laws in negotiating agreements with con-
tractors relative to subcontractors, 3 the Court did not address the
propriety of an injunction where the agreement is found to be
illegal.6 4 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, declined to anticipate that
preserve unit work or to maintain area standards. The thrust, instead, was to foster "top-
down" organizing in violation of sections 8(3) and 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. The administra-
tive law judge relied heavily on Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975); see n.63, infra.
0 549 F.2d at 175, 176 (citing New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 202 U.S.
552 (1938); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960)).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 113(c) (1970).
549 F.2d at 177 (citing Taxi-Cab Drivers Local 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co.,
123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941)).
11 Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (Sherman Act);
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (Sherman Act); Milk
Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) (Sherman Act);
Lee Way Motor Freight Lines v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1942)
(Motor Carrier Act).
0 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction could issue where
the union, with a view to increasing members' wages, combined with electrical contractors
and manufacturers to restrain competition in the marketing of electrical goods. The effect
of the agreement was to bar the sale within New York City of electrical equipment manu-
factured elsewhere.
0 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Connell arose out of facts nearly identical to those in Utilities Services. In a five-to-four
decision, the Court ruled that the agreement "indiscriminately excluded non-union sub-
contractors from a portion of the market" irrespective of the source of their competitive
advantage, if any. Id. at 623. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the
agreement violated the Sherman Act.
" Id. at 637 n.19.
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the Supreme Court would retreat from prior rulings holding alle-
gations alone insufficient to justify interference. 5
Sandra D. Besseghini
u 549 F.2d at 178.

